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SURVEY SECTION
Damages. McFarland v. Brier, 769 A.2d 605 (R.I. 2001). When
analyzing a case under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act the specific
intent of the legislature concerning the imposition of punitive dam-
ages and award of attorney's fees overrides the ordinary common
law standards. Further, a corporation can be held libel under the
Trade Secrets Act when the conduct of its employees constitutes a
piercing of the corporate veil.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The plaintiff, Mr. McFarland, was the owner of Read & Lundy,
Inc. (R&L), an industrial supply business.' McFarland hired the
defendant, Mr. Bibeau as a sales representative. 2 In 1990 the two
men agreed that McFarland would finance Bibeau's purchase of
R&L.3 In 1995 Bibeau fell behind in his payments to McFarland
and a new agreement was reached. This new agreement contained
a reciprocal non-compete provision and reacquired a $700,000
down payment to be made by August 31, 1995.4 When Bibeau
failed to make the down payment, McFarland required the
company.5
During Bibeau's time as president of R&L, Michael Brier and
his accounting company, Brier and Company were hired to assist
Bibeau in the financing and buyout of McFarland's interest in
R&L. 6 Brier and his firm had access to all of R&L's financial
records, customer lists, billing histories and supplier information. 7
Upon Bibeau's departure from R&L in 1995, he and Mr. Brier
formed Consigned Systems, Inc. (CSI), as a direct competitor with
R&L.8 Brier and Company was a major investor in this new enter-
prise. Brier and Bibeau used R&L's records to contact and attempt
to steal R&L's clients and also made some efforts to disguise their
blatant violation of the non-compete clause.9
McFarland prevailed in a series of lawsuits against Bibeau,
Brier and CSI. The United States District Court for the District of
1. McFarland v. Brier, 769 A.2d 605, 607 (R.I. 2001).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 607-08.
5. Id. at 608.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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Rhode Island upheld the non-compete clause and found that
Bibeau had violated the Trade Secrets Act.' 0 The Rhode Island
Superior Court found that CSI had misappropriated trade secrets
from R&L and that Brier was guilty of tortious interference with
the contractual relationship between McFarland and Bibeau. 1
ANALYSIS AND HOLDINGS
McFarland raised four issues on appeal. First, that the trial
judge erred in finding that R&L failed to mitigate its damages by
not rasing its prices after CSI was restrained from encroaching on
R&L's customer base. 12 The court agreed with McFarland, finding
that R&L did in fact mitigate their damages by lowering their
prices since "[u]nder the circumstances... in an act of self preser-
vation, plaintiffs mitigated their damages by reducing the markup
in the first instance rather than increasing it. "13
Second, it was argued that the trial court erred in its determi-
nation that Brier and Company, as a corporate defendant, was not
liable for damages under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.14 In
agreeing with McFarland, the supreme court found that while nor-
mally a corporation cannot be held libel for damages under the
Trade Secrets Act, when, as in this case, "'there is such a unity of
interest and ownership' that separate personalities of the individ-
ual and the corporation no longer exist in reality, 'adherence to the
principle of their separate existence would, under the circum-
stances, result in injustice.'"'15 Under the facts in this case, the
court held that the conduct of Brier was so closely intertwined with
the corporate defendant, Brier and Company, as to be acting as
alter egos and thus was held jointly and severely liable. 16
McFarland's third and fourth issues on appeal concerned the
proper standard to be applied under the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act for the imposition of punitive damages and attorney's fees.17
10. Id. at 608-09.
11. Id. at 609.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 610.
14. Id. at 609; see Uniform Trade Secrets Act, R.I. Gen. Laws §6-41-1 et. seq.
(2001).
15. Id. at 613 (quoting Muirhead v. Fairlawn Enter., Inc., 48 A.2d 414, 419
(R.I. 1946)).
16. Id. at 614.
17. Id. at 609.
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McFarland argued that the court need only determine if a "willful
and malicious" misappropriation of trade secrets occurred for puni-
tive damages to be awarded rather than the customary common
law standard of criminality that the superior court used.' 8 Again
the supreme court agreed with McFarland. The supreme court ac-
knowledged that normally punitive damages are restricted in
Rhode Island, requiring evidence of criminality or conduct that
should be punished.' 9 However, it is clear that when applying the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act the legislature specifically established
the lower standard of "willful and malicious misappropriation"
when considering the imposition of punitive damages.20 Finding
willful and malicious misappropriation in this case, the court
awarded McFarland the statutory maximum of twice the compen-
satory award as punitive damages. 21 Lastly, the court found that
the award of attorney's fees was specifically provided for in Rhode
Island General Laws section 6-41-4.22
CONCLUSION
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act provides that a "willful and
malicious" standard will be applied when determining if the action
of the defendant justifies the imposition of punitive damages in
trade secret misappropriation cases. In passing the uniform act,
the legislature has specifically overruled the common law standard
that requires a finding of "criminality" on the part of the defendant
before awarding punitive damages. The statute applies the same
standard when determining an award of attorney's fees. Further,
a corporation can be held liable under the Trade Secrets Act when
the actions of its employees have acted in such a way as to pierce
the corporate veil.
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18. Id.
19. Id. at 611.
20. Id. at 612 (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws §6-41-3 (2001)).
21. Id.
22. Id.
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